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Abstract—In this work, we address reliable communication of
low-latency packets in the presence of a full-duplex adversary
that is capable of executing a jamming attack while also being
able to measure the power levels on various frequency bands.
Due to the presence of a strong adversary, first, we point out
that traditional frequency-hopping does not help since unused
frequency bands may not be available, and moreover, the vic-
tim’s transition between the frequency bands would be detected
by the full-duplex adversary. Identifying these challenges, we
propose a new cooperative mitigation strategy, referred to as the
Semi-Coherent Fast-Forward Full-Duplex (SC-FFFD) relaying
technique, wherein the victim node, upon switching to a new
frequency band, seeks the assistance of its incumbent user, which
is also a full-duplex radio, to instantaneously forward its messages
to the destination using a portion of their powers. Meanwhile,
the two nodes cooperatively use their residual powers on the
jammed frequency band so as to engage the adversary to continue
executing the jamming attack on the same band. Using on-off
keying (OOK) and phase-shift-keying (PSK) as the modulation
schemes at the victim and the helper node, respectively, we derive
upper bounds on the probability of error of jointly decoding the
information symbols of the two nodes, and subsequently derive
analytical solutions to arrive at the power-splitting factor between
the two frequency bands to minimize the error of both the nodes.
We also present extensive simulation results for various signal-to-
noise-ratio values and PSK constellations to showcase the efficacy
of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless applications with low-latency constraints have re-
ceived traction in the recent past owing to the emergence
of vehicular networks, involving autonomous vehicles, Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles etc [1]. While it is imperative to
revisit the design of physical-layer algorithms to facilitate low-
latency constraints, it is equally important to develop new
countermeasures to mitigate Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks
[2] such as jamming, since violation of deadline constraints
could lead to catastrophic consequences. Although jamming
attack is a well known threat model, and a number of coun-
termeasures have been well studied against it, e.g., Frequency
Hopping (FH) [3], such traditional mitigation techniques may
not be applicable in next-generation networks owing to lack
of unused frequency bands due to exponential growth in the
number of wireless devices. On the one hand, lack of unused
frequency bands certainly poses interesting questions on how
to provide ubiquitous and seamless communication of low-
latency packets of the victim’s node in a frequency band that
is already occupied by another node in the network. On the
other hand, the very idea of asking the victim node to switch
to a new frequency band is questionable especially if the
adversary is equipped with sophisticated hardware to execute
the jamming attack. For instance, suppose that the adversary,
which is equipped with an ideal Full-Duplex (FD) radio, is
capable of executing the jamming attack on a frequency band,
and is also able to simultaneously measure the power levels
on various frequency bands including the one that is jammed.
In such a case, the adversary can measure a significant drop
in the power levels on the jammed frequency as soon as the
victim switches to another frequency band. Therefore, such a
reaction may compel the adversary to execute the jamming
attack on another frequency band, thereby guaranteeing DOS
attack on at least one of the nodes in the network.
Besides the above observation on the FD adversary, it
is clear that due to lack of unused frequency bands the
victim node must necessarily share a new frequency band
with another node so that the low-latency packets are reliably
communicated to the destination within the deadline. Further-
more, the co-existence of the two nodes in the new frequency
band must be such that the incumbent user must continue
to transmit its information symbols to the destination, and
moreover the victim node must also communicate its low-
latency packets to reach the destination within the deadline.
As a potential solution to achieve the above objective, we
propose the use of a FD radio at the incumbent node, which
can listen to the messages of the victim node, decode it,
and instantaneously forward it to the destination along with
its messages. Although one of the challenges of building a
FD radio is perfect self-interference-cancellation (SIC), recent
technological advancements [4], [5] have shown promising
results towards SIC within desirable limits. Furthermore, apart
from the FD features, the prospects of building a fast-forward
FD radios have also been explored wherein FD radios can
instantaneously process the received symbols and then forward
it in the same band. For instance, in [6], the authors were able
to achieve near perfect SIC in order of µs for WiFi signals.
Other than the system-related work [6] on fast-forward relays,
several theoretical contributions on fast-forward relays have
also been reported in the recent past. For more details, we
refer the readers to [7] and the references within.
A. Contributions
We address a new framework to reliably communicate
low-latency messages in the presence of a strong adversarial
model wherein the attacker, which is equipped with a FD
radio, has the capability to execute a jamming attack on a
frequency band while also being able to measure the power
levels on a wide range of frequency bands. To mitigate the
above threat, we present the Semi-Coherent Fast-Forward Full-
Duplex (SC-FFFD) relaying technique, wherein the victim
node uses (1 − α) fraction of its power, for some 0 < α <
1, on a new frequency band to communicate its messages
to the destination, while continuing to transmit its residual
power on the jammed frequency band. Meanwhile, a full-
duplex helper node, which is the incumbent user of the new
frequency band, listens to the victim’s message, decodes it,
and instantaneously forwards it to the destination along with
its messages using α fraction of its power. Furthermore, the
helper node also pours its residual 1 − α fraction of power
on the jammed frequency band thereby ensuring that the two
nodes cooperatively maintain the same power levels on both
the frequency bands. With such a strategy, the helper node
assists the victim’s message to reach the destination without
violating the latency constraints. Using On-Off Keying (OOK)
and Phase-Shift-Keying (PSK) as the modulation schemes at
the victim and the helper node, respectively, we present a
thorough analysis on the error performance of the SC-FFFD
technique when the destination employs a joint decoder on the
new frequency band. We derive upper bounds on the average
probability of error of the joint decoder at high signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) values, and subsequently identify dominant
error terms as a function of α, henceforth referred to as the
power-splitting factor. Finally, we prove non-trivial relations
between the dominant terms to determine an appropriate value
of α that minimizes the average probability of error of the
joint decoder. Through extensive simulations, we show that
the average probability of error of the SC-FFFD technique
decreases with increasing SNR, which in turn implies that
the victim node can reliably communicate its messages to the
destination.
Although [6], [8]–[10] have studied jamming aspects with
relaying techniques and FD radios, they have not addressed the
idea of fast-forward relaying to engage an FD jammer on one
frequency band. Among these prior works, the contributions
of [10] is closest to our work. However, unlike our work,
[10] assumes sufficient number of unused frequency bands to
execute FH as countermeasure, and moreover, their mitigation
technique does not engage the jammer on one frequency band.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the victim, the helper, the
attacker and the destination as Alice, Charlie, Dave and Bob,
respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a network model, as shown in Fig. 1, consisting
of two nodes, namely Alice and Charlie, that communicate
with a base station, namely Bob, using orthogonal frequencies,
represented by fAB and fCB , respectively. We assume that
unused frequency bands are not available as the network is
operating at capacity with maximum number of users. The
network requirements of Alice and Charlie are heterogeneous
in the sense that Alice is interested in communicating low-rate
Alice Bob
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Dave
fCB
fAB
α
α
1− α
1− α
α
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Fig. 1. Depiction of the system model comprising Alice (the victim node),
Charlie (the helper node), Bob (the destination), and Dave (the jammer with
FD radio). Upon experiencing a jamming attack on fAB , Alice seeks the
assistance of Charlie, which has a FD radio, to instantaneously forward her
messages to Bob on frequency band fCB .
messages that have low-latency constraints, whereas Charlie is
interested in communicating high-rate messages that need not
satisfy any low-latency constraints. The network also includes
an active adversary, namely, Dave, that injects high-powered
noise signals on fAB to execute a DOS attack on the low-
latency messages of Alice. A key feature of the attack model
is that Dave is equipped with a FD radio with perfect SIC
capability such that it can scan a wide range of spectrum to
measure the average power levels including fAB and fCB.
With the existence of such a vigilant jammer, Alice must
somehow mitigate this jamming attack so as to continue
transmitting her low-latency messages to Bob. Although a
straightforward mitigation strategy for Alice is to hop to
another frequency band, such a strategy would assist Dave
to identify a significant drop in the power levels on fAB .
This frequency hole on fAB would further compel Dave to
attack on one of the remaining frequency bands resulting in
degradation of error performance of at least one of the nodes
in the network. Therefore, while it is necessary for Alice to
hop to another frequency band, Dave must neither observe a
dip in the power levels on fAB, nor observe a surge in the
power levels of another frequency band. Furthermore, Alice
must not communicate any pilots on the new frequency band
since the communication-overhead in pilot transmission does
not help the low-latency constraints on the packets.
In the next section, we present a new cooperative relaying
strategy wherein Alice seeks the help of Charlie (in the
vicinity) to communicate her low-latency messages to Bob.
III. SEMI-COHERENT FAST-FORWARD FULL-DUPLEX
RELAYING TECHNIQUE
As a countermeasure to mitigate the jamming attack, Bob
directs Alice to switch to the frequency band fCB, which is
already used by Charlie. Furthermore, Bob guides Charlie to
continue operating on fCB , while also requesting him to relay
Alice’s information symbols in the FD mode. Since Charlie is
capable of fast-forward relaying, he listens to the transmission
of Alice on fCB, decodes her information symbol, and then
instantaneously forwards the decoded symbol to Bob by ap-
propriately embedding it with its message using physical-layer
techniques. As a consequence, Bob witnesses a multiple access
channel on the frequency band fCB by receiving a linear
combination of symbols from both Alice and Charlie. While
this idea of fast-forward relaying serves Alice’s messages to
reach Bob with no additional delay, it is important to note
that Dave will now observe zero transmission power in the
frequency band fAB . To circumvent this problem, we propose
a power-splitting strategy between the two nodes, wherein
Alice and Charlie employ 1 − α and α fractions of their
power on the frequency band fCB, respectively, for some
α ∈ (0, 1). Meanwhile, they use their residual powers of α
and 1 − α fractions on fAB. As a result of this strategy, the
attacker Dave neither observes a surge in the power level on
fCB nor a dip in the power level on fAB , thus deceiving
Dave to believe that Alice has continued to transmit on fAB.
Henceforth, throughout this work, we refer to this strategy as
the Fast-Forward Full-Duplex (FFFD) relaying scheme.
Under the framework of FFFD relaying scheme, we are in-
terested in a semi-coherent (SC) modulation scheme, wherein
Alice employs a non-coherent modulation technique, e.g.
OOK, and Charlie employs a conventional coherent modula-
tion technique, e.g., PSK, QAM. We highlight that the use of
non-coherent modulation technique at Alice is to reduce the
communication-overhead of transmitting pilot symbols upon
switching to the frequency band fCB, thereby facilitating the
transmission of low-latency messages to Bob. In the next
section, we present a detailed explanation on the signaling
scheme of the SC-FFFD protocol.
A. Signal Model of SC-FFFD Relaying Protocol
In the proposed SC-FFFD relaying protocol, Alice employs
OOK, denoted by the constellation SA = {0, 1}, whereas
Charlie uses the traditional M -PSK constellation, denoted by
the constellation SC = {e ι2pi(j+0.5)M | j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1},
where ι =
√−1, and M = 2m, for some positive integer
m. As highlighted earlier, Charlie uses a full-duplex radio
with perfect SIC capability. Upon transmission of information
symbol from Alice, Charlie decodes Alice’s symbols, and
depending on the decoded bit, he instantaneously transmits a
modified version of theM -PSK symbol so that Bob can jointly
decode the information symbols of both Alice and Charlie. In
particular, if x ∈ SA is transmitted from Alice on fCB, Charlie
receives
rC =
√
1− αhACx+ nC ,
where 1−α is the associated power when transmitting symbol
1, the complex number hAC ∼ CN (0, σ2AC) is the baseband
channel between Alice and Charlie, and nC ∼ CN (0, No) is
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Charlie. Due to
proximity between Alice and Charlie, we assume σ2AC ≥ 1.
Owing to no knowledge of the instantaneous channel real-
ization hAC , Charlie performs non-coherent energy detection
to obtain an estimate of x, denoted by xˆC . Furthermore, in
order to transmit its own information symbol y ∈ SC , Charlie
transmits {
y, if xˆC = 0;√
αe
ιpi
M y, if xˆC = 1.
With that, Charlie transmits a symbol from either SC or√
αe
ιpi
M SC at a given round of transmission. As a result of
this instantaneous processing at Charlie, the baseband symbol
received at Bob is of the form
rB =


hCB y + nB , if x = 0, xˆC = 0;
hCB
√
αe
ιpi
M y + nB , if x = 0, xˆC = 1;
hCB y + hAB
√
1− α+ nB , if x = 1, xˆC = 0;
hCB
√
αe
ιpi
M y + hAB
√
1− α+ nB , if x = 1, xˆC = 1;
(1)
where hCB ∼ CN (0, 1) is the baseband channel between
Charlie and Bob, hAB ∼ CN (0, 1) is the baseband channel
from Alice to Bob, and nB ∼ CN (0, No) is the AWGN at
Bob. Since Charlie communicates with Bob using coherent
signaling method, we assume that Bob has perfect knowledge
of the channel realization hCB . Since Alice has shifted her
frequency to fCB as a reaction against jamming, and no
pilots are communicated on fCB , we assume that Bob has no
knowledge hAB . We assume that all the channel realizations
and additive noise components are statistically independent.
Henceforth, throughout this paper, we denote SNR = 1
No
.
With the signal model in (1), Bob needs to decode the
information symbols of both Alice and Charlie. To assist joint
detection of information symbols of both nodes, Alice’s in-
formation symbol can be recovered by observing two metrics:
(i) whether rB is closer to a point in
√
αe
ιpi
M SC instead of a
point in SC , and (ii) whether the energy contributed by the
effective additive noise is 1−α+No instead of No. Overall,
this framework of joint decoding of the information symbols
of Alice and Charlie corresponds to applying a combination
of coherent and non-coherent decoding mechanism on an
equivalent multiple access channel model induced by the SC-
FFFD relaying protocol.
B. Observation on Power Measurements at Dave
In the FFFD relaying protocol, both Alice and Charlie
communicate simultaneously on the frequency band fCB . As a
result, with the assumption that the decoding error introduced
at Charlie is negligible, the average power measured on fCB
is unity irrespective of whether Alice transmits symbol 1 or
symbol 0. Meanwhile, whenever Alice transmits symbol 1,
upon correctly decoding it at Charlie, in the FFFD protocol,
Charlie transmits its residual power (1 − α) on fAB . Con-
currently, Alice also transmits its residual power α on fAB ,
and as a result, the total average power observed on fAB
continues to be one and zero when symbol 1 and symbol 0
is transmitted by Alice, respectively. This implies that upon
power measurements at Dave, the power levels measured
on fCB continues to be unity, which is same as the power
measured before Charlie helped Alice. Similarly, the power
levels measured on fAB continues to be that of OOK, which
is same as the power measured on fAB before Charlie helped
Alice.
dP11
dα
=
(
NC0
NC0 + σ2AC(1− α)
)NC0+σ2AC(1−α)
σ2
AC
(1−α)
×
σ2AC(1− α)
(
ln
[
NC0
NC0+σ
2
AC
(1−α)
]
+ 1
)
+NC0ln
[
NC0
NC0+σ
2
AC
(1−α)
]
σ2AC(1− α)2
. (2)
C. Error performance at Charlie.
With non-coherent energy detection, Charlie makes a deci-
sion using the likelihood ratio f(rC |x = 0)
0
≷
1
f(rC |x = 1),
where f(rC |x = i) is the probability density function of rC
conditioned on x = i, for i ∈ SA. With that, the probability
of decoding symbol 0 as symbol 1 at Charlie is given by
P01 = Pr


1
piNC0
e
−
|rC |2
NC0
1
piNC1
e
−
|rC |2
NC1
< 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
rC = nC

 = e
− β
NC0 ,
where NC0 = No, NC1 = σ
2
AC(1 − α) + No, β =
NC0NC1
NC0−NC1
ln
(
NC0
NC1
)
. Thus, the probability of correct decoding
of symbol 0 is given by P00 = 1−P01 = 1−e−
β
NC0 . Similarly,
the probability of decoding symbol 1 as symbol 0 can be
computed as
P10 = Pr


1
piNC1
e
−
|rC |2
NC1
1
piNC0
e
−
|rC |2
NC0
< 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
rC = hAC
√
1− α+ nC

 ,
= 1− e− βNC1 .
Thus, the probability of correct decoding of symbol 1 is given
by P11 = 1 − P10 = e−
β
NC1 . Note that both P01 and P10
are functions of α. In the following lemmas, we present some
insights on P01 and P10.
Lemma 1. The term P11 decreases as α increases in the
interval (0, 1).
Proof. The term P11 can be rewritten as
P11 =
(
NC0
NC0 + σ2AC(1− α)
) NC0
σ2
AC
(1−α)
. (3)
Differentiating P11 w.r.t. α, we get (2). If we
closely observe the numerator of the second term,
we have NC0ln
[
NC0
NC0+σ2AC(1−α)
]
< 0, and for
σ2AC(1 − α)
(
ln
[
NC0
NC0+σ2AC(1−α)
]
+ 1
)
< 0, this implies
α ≤ α1 , 1 − 1.71NC0σ2AC . Let α
+
1 = 1 − ωNC0σ2AC such that
0 < ω < 1.71. Substituting α+1 in (3) yields
1
(1+ω)
1
ω
, which
is a decreasing function when 0 < ω < 1.71. Therefore, P11
decreases with α in the interval (0, 1).
Lemma 2. The expressions for P01 and P10 are such that
P11 > P10 for α ∈ (0, 1−NC0σ2
AC
), and P00 > P01 for α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Since P10 is an increasing function of α, we are inter-
ested in computing the value of α for which P10 = 0.5. The
expression for P10 can be rewritten as 1 −
(
NC0
NC1
) NC0
NC1−NC0
.
This implies that
(
NC0
NC0+σ2AC(1−α)
) NC0
σ2
AC
(1−α)
= 0.5 only when
σ2AC(1 − α) = NC0. Therefore, until α < 1 − NC0σ2AC , the
term P11 dominates P10. Note that at high SNR, i.e., when
NC0 << 1, this implies that P11 dominates P10 in the interval
α ∈ (0, 1− ǫ), where ǫ is a negligible number. For the second
result of this lemma, the expression for P01 can be rewritten
as (
NC0
NC0 + σ2AC(1 − α)
)NC0+σ2AC(1−α)
σ2
AC
(1−α)
.
Denoting σ2AC(1−α) = δNC0, for δ > 0, the above expression
can be written as(
1
1 + δ
) 1+δ
δ
=
(
1
1 + δ
)
1
(1 + δ)
1
δ
<
(
1
1 + δ
)
1
2
,
where the inequality follows because of the lower bound (1+
δ)
1
δ > 2 when δ > 0. This implies that P01 never hits 0.5, and
therefore, P00 dominates P01 in the interval α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3. For any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have P01 < P10.
Proof. The ratio P10
P01
is given by
P10
P01
=
1− e− βNC1
e
− β
NC0
=
(
NC1
NC0
) NC1
NC1−NC0 −
(
NC1
NC0
)
,
=
NC1
NC0


(
NC1
NC0
) NC0
NC1−NC0 − 1

 ,
= (1 + δ)
(
(1 + δ)
1
δ − 1
)
,
where the last equality is written by substituting σ2AC(1−α) =
δNC0, for δ > 0. Since NC1 ≥ NC0, we have (1 + δ) 1δ > 2,
and therefore, we conclude that P01 < P10.
Having understood the behavior of P11 and P00 as a
function of α, we proceed to analyze the error performance of
jointly decoding the information symbols of Alice and Charlie
at Bob.
D. Error performance at Bob
Based on the signal model in (1), it is clear that Bob has
to make use of a combination of coherent and non-coherent
detection method to jointly decode the information symbols
of Alice and Charlie. It is worthwhile to note that when Alice
transmits symbol 1, the symbol received at Bob has higher
noise variance as compared to when symbol 0 was transmitted.
Therefore, we represent the effective noise variance at Bob as
NB0 = No when Alice transmits symbol 0, and also NB1 =
No + (1 − α) when Alice transmits symbol 1. To arrive at
NB1, we have used the fact that hAB ∼ CN (0, 1). From first
principles, a Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) detector to jointly
decode i ∈ {0, 1} for OOK, and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M−1} for the
PSK symbol e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , for the above signal model is given
by
iˆ, jˆ = argmax
i,j
g
(
rB |x = i, y = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB
)
, (4)
where g
(
rB|x = i, y = e ι2pi(j+0.5)M , hCB
)
is the probability
density function of rB subject to a given realizations of i and
j, and also the realization of the channel hCB. Since Charlie
may also add error events when decoding x, the conditional
density function of rB is a Gaussian mixture weighed by the
probabilities of decoding error at Charlie. In particular, we
have g
(
rB |x = 0, y = e ι2pi(j+0.5)M , hCB
)
given by
P00f0(rB |t = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB) +
P01f0(rB |t =
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB)
such that f0(rB |t, hCB) = 1piNB0 e
−
|rB−hCBt|2
NB0 . Similarly, we
have g
(
rB |x = 1, y = e ι2pi(j+0.5)M , hCB
)
given by
P10f1(rB |t = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB) +
P11f1(rB |t =
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB),
such that f1(rB |t, hCB) = 1piNB1 e
−
|rB−hCBt|2
NB1 .
It is straightforward to note that the average probability of
error of the joint MAP decoder in (4) is a function of α since
the intra-distance properties of the constellation observed by
Bob varies with α. Therefore, an important task is to compute
α ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes this average probability of error.
However, we notice that evaluating the average probability of
error of the MAP decoder is non-trivial mainly due to the
intricacies involved in handling Gaussian mixtures. Towards
obtaining a near-optimal solution, we present an approxima-
tion on the MAP decoder, and subsequently compute the value
of α that minimizes the probability of error of the sub-optimal
decoder
IV. FAST FORWARD FULL DUPLEX DOMINANT DECODER
When handling Gaussian mixture as a priori probability
density function in the MAP detector of (4), it is well known
that the decoding metric [14, Section II.A]
iˆ, jˆ = argmax
i,j
gm
(
rB |x = i, y = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB
)
, (5)
provides near-optimal error performance where
gm
(
rB |x = i, y = e ι2pi(j+0.5)M , hCB
)
is given in (6) and
(7), for i = 0 and i = 1, respectively. Furthermore, in (6) and
(7), we note that the terms P11 and P00 respectively dominate
P10 and P01 due to the results in Lemma 2. As a result, we
present a sub-optimal decoder in the following definition.
Definition 1. Using the results in Lemma 2, the decoding
metric in (5) can be further reduced by dropping the terms
with P01 and P10 as
iˆ, jˆ = argmax
i,j
ga
(
rB |x = i, y = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB
)
, (8)
where
ga (rB |x = 0, y, hCB) = P00
πNB0
e
−
|rB−hCB y|2
NB0 ,
ga (rB |x = 1, y, hCB) = P11
πNB1
e
−
|rB−hCB
√
αe
pi
M y|2
NB1 .
Henceforth, throughput the paper, we refer to the decoder in
(8) as the Fast-Forward Full-Duplex Joint Dominant (FFFD-
JD) decoder. Based on the decoding metric in (8), Bob uses rB
to decode to a point in the constellation SC ∪√αe ιpiM SC ⊂ C,
wherein the Gaussian distribution centered around the points
in SC has variance NB0, whereas the Gaussian distribution
centered around the points in
√
αe
ιpi
M SC has variance NB1.
For instance, an example for the constellation SC ∪√αe ιpiM SC
with M = 4 is shown in Fig. 2, where the set of circles denote
SC and the set of diamonds denote √αe ιpiM SC .
In the next section, we compute upper bounds on the prob-
ability of error of jointly decoding the symbols of OOK and
PSK constellation using the FFFD JD decoder. Subsequently,
we use the upper bound to recover an appropriate value of
α ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes the average probability of error of
the FFFD JD decoder.
A. Error Performance of FFFD Joint Dominant Decoder
With FFFD JD decoder as given in (8), a pair (i, j) ∈
{0, 1}×{0, 1, . . . ,M−1} can be incorrectly decoded as (¯i, j¯)
such that (¯i, j¯) 6= (i, j) if
∆(i,j)−>(¯i,j¯) ,
ga
(
rB |x = i¯, y = e ι2pi(j¯+0.5)M , hCB
)
ga
(
rB |x = i, y = e ι2pi(j+0.5)M , hCB
) ≥ 1,
where ∆(i,j)−>(¯i,j¯) is the error event. Furthermore, if Alice
and Charlie have chosen the pair (i = 0, j), the probability
that Bob incorrectly decodes to another pair (¯i, j¯), denoted by
Pr ((0, j)→ (¯i, j¯)), is given by
Pr ((0, j)→ (¯i, j¯)) = P00Pr
(
∆(0,j)→(¯i,j¯) ≥ 1
∣∣ rB = r00)
+ P01Pr
(
∆(0,j)→(¯i,j¯) ≥ 1
∣∣ rB = r01), (9)
where r00 = hCBe
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M + nB and r01 =
hCB
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M + nB . Similarly, if Alice and Charlie
have chosen the pair (i = 1, j), the probability that Bob
incorrectly decodes to another pair (¯i, j¯), denoted by
Pr ((1, j)→ (¯i, j¯)), is given by
Pr ((1, j)→ (¯i, j¯)) = P11Pr
(
∆(1,j)→(¯i,j¯) ≥ 1
∣∣ rB = r11)
+ P10Pr
(
∆(1,j)→(¯i,j¯) ≥ 1
∣∣ rB = r10), (10)
where r11 = hCB
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M + hAB
√
1− α + nB
and r10 = hCBe
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M + hAB
√
1− α + nB . To compute
Pr ((i, j)→ (¯i, j¯)), we have considered the error events when
gm
(
rB|x = 0, y = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB
)
= max
(
P00f0(rB|t = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB), P01f0(rB |t =
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB)
)
(6)
gm
(
rB|x = 1, y = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB
)
= max
(
P10f1(rB|t = e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB), P11f1(rB |t =
√
αe
ιpi
M e
ι2pi(j+0.5)
M , hCB)
)
(7)
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Fig. 2. An example for the two-dimensional constellation observed by Bob
as a result of the SC-FFFD relaying protocol. With M = 4, the set of black
circles represent the constellation SC used by Charlie upon decoding symbol
0 from Alice, whereas the set of red diamonds represent the scaled and rotated
version of the constellation SC used by Charlie upon decoding symbol 1 from
Alice.
decoding Alice’s symbols at Charlie. Overall, for a given hCB,
the probability of error of the decoder in (8) is given by
Pr(error|hCB) = 1
2M
∑
(i,j)
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (i, j)|(i, j)), (11)
where Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (i, j)|(i, j)) is the probability that Bob
decodes to a pair other than (i, j), when (i, j) is chosen by
Alice and Charlie. Furthermore, using union bound, we have
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (i, j)|(i, j)) ≤
∑
(¯i,j¯) 6=(i,j)
Pr ((i, j)→ (¯i, j¯)) , (12)
where Pr ((0, j)→ (¯i, j¯)) and Pr ((1, j)→ (¯i, j¯)) are given in
(9) and (10), respectively.
In the following theorem, we present high SNR approxima-
tions on Pr(error|hCB ) given in (11).
Theorem 4. At high SNR values, i.e., No << 1, the term
Pr(error|hCB) in (11) is upper bounded as
Pr(error|hCB) ≤ Pr ((0, 1)→ (1, 1)) +
Pr ((1, 1)→ (1, 2)) +
Pr ((1, 1)→ (0, 1)) . (13)
Proof. At high SNR values, for a given j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M−1},
the term Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (0, j)|(0, j)) is upper bounded as
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (0, j)|(0, j)) ≤ 2Pr ((0, j)→ (1, j)) , (14)
wherein the rest of the terms in the union bound are neglected
since their contributions are not dominant. Furthermore, due
to the symmetry in the constellation, we have
M−1∑
j=0
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (0, j)|(0, j)) ≤ 2M (Pr ((0, 1)→ (1, 1))) .
(15)
Similarly, for a given j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}, the term
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (1, j)|(1, j)) is upper bounded
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (1, j)|(1, j)) ≤ 2Pr ((1, j)→ (0, j)) +
2Pr ((1, j)→ (1, (j + 1) modulo M)) , (16)
wherein the rest of the terms in the union bound are neglected
since their contributions are not dominant. Furthermore, due
to the symmetry in the constellation, we have
M−1∑
j=0
Pr((ˆi, jˆ) 6= (1, j)|(1, j)) ≤ 2M (Pr ((1, 1)→ (0, 1))) +
2M (Pr ((1, 1)→ (1, 2))) .
Finally, by substituting (15) and (17) in (11), we get (13). This
completes the proof.
Based on Theorem 4, three pair-wise error events domi-
nate the error probability of the joint decoder at high SNR
values. At lower values of α, the error probability is domi-
nated by Pr ((1, 1)→ (1, 2)), which is dictated by the intra-
constellation symbols of the rotatedM -PSK constellation; this
is because the minimum distance of
√
αe
ιpi
M SC (denoted by ℓ
in Fig. 2) is small and also the effective noise variance of the
received symbol is very high. In contrast, as α starts to ascend,
Pr ((0, 1)→ (1, 1)) and Pr ((1, 1)→ (0, 1)) dominate, which
are dictated by the distance between symbols of
√
αe
ιpi
M SC
and SC (denoted by d in Fig. 2). In the following proposi-
tion, we evaluate Pr ((0, 1)→ (1, 1)), Pr ((1, 1)→ (1, 2)) and
Pr ((1, 1)→ (0, 1)) by using their definition in (9) and (10).
Proposition 1. Pr ((0, 1)→ (1, 1)) = P00P1 +P01P c1 , where
P1 = Q1
( |A|
σB0
,
√
ξ
σB0
)
, (17)
P c1 = Q1
( |B|
σB0
,
√
ξ
σB0
)
, (18)
where Q1(·, ·) is the Marcum-Q function such that A =
γdNB0
NB0−NB1
, d =
√
(1 + α− 2√αcos pi
M
), γ = |hCB|, ξ =
NB0NB,1
NB0−NB1
[
ln
(
NB0P11
NB1P00
)
+ γ
2d2
NB0−NB1
]
, σB0 =
√
NB0
2 , and
B = γdNB1
NB0−NB1
.
Proposition 2. Pr ((1, 1)→ (0, 1)) = P11P2 + P10P c2 where
P2 = 1−Q1
( |B|
σB1
,
√
ξ
σB1
)
, (19)
P c2 = 1−Q1
( |A|
σB1
,
√
ξ
σB1
)
, (20)
where σB1 =
√
NB1
2 , in addition to the notations defined in
the previous proposition.
Proposition 3. Pr ((1, 1)→ (1, 2)) = P11P3 + P10P c3 where
P3 = Q
(
γℓ√
2NB1
)
, (21)
P c3 = 0.5, (22)
where ℓ = 2
√
α sin pi
M
, in addition to the notations defined in
the previous propositions.
Using the expressions from the above propositions in (13),
Pr(error|hCB) is bounded by
P00P1 +P01P
c
1 + P11P2 + P10P
c
2 + P11P3 + P100.5. (23)
Since P01 is negligible for all values of α, we replace
the term P00P1 + P01P
c
1 by P1 in the above expression.
Furthermore, note that P11, P10, P00 are independent of hCB,
whereas P1, P2, P
c
2 , P3 are functions of hCB. In the following
proposition, we present the average probability of error of
the joint dominant decoder, henceforth denoted as P e,Joint =
E|hCB |2 [Pr(error|hCB )].
Proposition 4. The average probability of error of the joint
dominant decoder is upper bounded as
P e,Joint ≤ P1,avg + P11E|hCB |2 [P2] + P10E|hCB |2 [P c2 ]
+ P11P3,avg + P100.5, (24)
where
P1,avg =
(
NB0P11
NB1P00
) NB1
NB1−NB0 (NB0 −NB1)2
(NB0 −NB1)2 + d2NB1 ,
P3,avg =
2NB1
4NB1 + ℓ2
.
Proof. Towards computing E|hCB |2 [P1], we use the up-
per bound on the Marcum-Q function given by P1 ≤
e
− 12
( √
ξ
σB0
− |A|
σB0
)2
. Furthermore, we observe that |A| << √ξ,
and thus, simplifying the bound as P1 ≤ e−
1
2
( √
ξ
σB0
)2
. Finally,
averaging it over |hCB|2, we get E|hCB |2 [P1] < P1,avg.
Similarly, towards computing E|hCB |2 [P3], we apply Chernoff-
bound on the Q Function, and subsequently average it over
|hCB|2 to get E|hCB |2 [P3] < P3,avg.
In the following result, we prove that P1,avg is not a
dominant term of (24) when the SNR is sufficiently large.
Theorem 5. Let ς = cos pi
M
, where M is the size of PSK
constellation such that (1 − ς2) = µNo, where µ >> 1, then
we have the inequality P1,avg < P11P3,avg + P100.5.
Proof. We first prove P1,avg < P3,avg . In other words, we
need to prove
2NB1
4NB1 + ℓ2
≥
(
NB0P11
NB1P00
) NB1
NB1−NB0 (NB0 −NB1)2
(NB0 −NB1)2 + d2NB1 .
The expression for P1,avg can be further upper bounded as
P1,avg ≤
(
NB0P11
NB1P00
) NB1
NB1−NB0 1− α
2− 2√αcos pi
M
. (25)
Let 1− α = ρNo, then (25) becomes
P1,avg <
(
P11
(ρ+ 1)P00
) 1+ρ
ρ ρNo
2− 2
√
1− ρNocos piM
, (26)
<
(
1
ρ+ 1
) 1+ρ
ρ ρNo
2− 2
√
1− ρNocos pi,M
, (27)
where the second inequality is applicable because P11 <
P00, ∀α from Lemma 3. Also, the expression for P3,avg is
rewritten as
P3,avg =
(ρ+ 1)No
No(2(1 + ρ)− 2ρ(1− ς2)) + 2(1− ς2) , (28)
where ς = cos pi
M
. In the rest of the proof, we prove that
either (26) or (27) is less than (28) considering three cases:
ρ = 1, ρ < 1, and ρ > 1.
For ρ = 1, (27) reduces to 18
No
1−ς , by substituting ρ = 1
and also upper bounding (1 − ρNo) by 1. Also, (28) can be
simplified as No
No(1+ς2)+(1−ς2)
. Further, since (1− ς2) = µNo,
where µ >> 1, we have No(1 + ς
2) < 1− ς2, and therefore,
(28) can be lower bounded by No2(1−ς2) . Thus, we can easily
conclude that 18
No
1−ς <
No
2(1−ς2) , ∀ 0 < ς < 1.
For, ρ < 1, we have the bound
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ
< 1
e
, and
therefore, (27) is upper bounded as 15.42
ρNo
1−ς . Further, we have
1
5.42
ρNo
1−ς =
ρ(1+ς)
5.42µ <
2ρ
5.42µ . Also, in the first term in the
denominator of (28), we have the bound No(2(1+ρ)−2ρ(1−
ς2)) < No(2(1 + ρ)) < 4No. Thus, (28) is lower bounded by
(ρ+1)
2(2+µ) . We can immediately infer that
(ρ+1)
2(2+µ) >
2ρ
5.42µ when
µ >> 1 and for ρ < 1. This completes the case of ρ < 1.
For, ρ > 1, we split the case into two parts, namely, (i)
1 < ρ ≤ 3, and (ii) ρ > 3. For 1 < ρ ≤ 3, the first term of de-
nominator of (28) is upper bounded as 8No, and therefore (28)
is lower bounded as ρ+12(4+µ) . Furthermore, upper bounding (27)
on similar lines gives us
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ ρ(1+ς)
2µ <
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ ρ
µ
.
Form this discussion, we can conclude that(
1
1 + ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ ρ
µ
<
ρ+ 1
2(4 + µ)
, (29)
wherein the above inequality holds good because
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ
is a decreasing function of ρ and is upper bounded by 14 .
For ρ > 3, if the condition No(2(1 + ρ) − 2ρ(1 − ς2)) <
2(1 − ς2) holds, then (28) is lower bounded as (ρ+1)No4(1−ς2) =
1+ρ
4µ . Furthermore, (27) is upper bounded as
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ ρNo
2(1−ς) ,
in which the following inequalities
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ
<
(
1
4
) 4
3 and
ρNo
2(1−ς) =
ρNo(1+ς)
2(1−ς2) <
ρ
µ
hold. It is now straightforward to
prove that 0.157ρ
µ
<
0.25(ρ+1)
µ
, for 0 < ς < 1 and ρ > 3.
Additionally, for the case ρ > 3, and ρ ≤ µ, if we have
No(2(1 + ρ) − 2ρ(1 − ς2)) > 2(1 − ς2), then (28) is lower
bounded as
(1+ρ)No
2No[2(1+ρ)−2ρ(1−ς2)]
>
(1+ρ)No
4No(1+ρ)
= 14 . Therefore,
0.157ρ
µ
< 14 . Now for ρ > 3 and also, ρ > µ, i.e., for larger
values of ρ, we have
(
1
1+ρ
) 1+ρ
ρ
< 11+ρ , and therefore, (27) is
upper bounded as 11+ρ
ρ
µ
< 1
µ
. We can clearly see that, 1
µ
< 14 ,
because µ >> 1. This completes the case of ρ > 3.
Finally, since P1,avg is also less than 0.5, the statement of
the theorem is proved because P11P3,avg+P100.5 is a convex
combination. This completes the proof.
Using Theorem 5, we can further upper bound P e,Joint as
P e,Joint ≤ 2Pdom, where
Pdom = P11
(
P3,avg + E|hCB |2 [P2]
)
+P10
(
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] +
1
2
)
,
(30)
such that Pdom represents the dominant error events of the
overall probability of error. Note that each term of (30) is a
function of α. Therefore, we are interested in characterizing
the range of values of α in which one of the terms in Pdom
is significant than the others. This way, we can arrive at an
appropriate value of α that minimizes the dominant error
component of the joint probability of error of the FFFD JD
decoder.
B. Domination of Error Events as a Function of α
To characterize the behavior of Pdom as a function of α,
it is important to evaluate E|hCB |2 [P2] and E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] in
closed form. However, since both P2 and P
c
2 are related of
Marcum-Q functions, it is well known that exact expressions
of E|hCB |2 [P2] and E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] cannot be derived. On the
other hand, while tight lower and upper bounds are available
for P c2 [12], we notice that bounds are loose for P2 [12], and
as a result, the subsequent upper bounds on Pdom will also be
loose. Therefore, in this work, we do not take the conventional
approach of minimizing Pdom (or its upper bound) over
α ∈ (0, 1).
Applying numerical integration techniques to
compute E|hCB |2 [P2] and E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ], we observe that
P11
(
P3,avg + E|hCB |2 [P2]
)
is a decreasing function of α,
whereas P10
(
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] +
1
2
)
is an increasing function of α.
With that insight, computing the point of intersection between
P11
(
P3,avg + E|hCB |2 [P2]
)
and P10
(
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] +
1
2
)
would give us a value of α, say α = α† below which
the term P11
(
P3,avg + E|hCB |2 [P2]
)
dominates the term
P10
(
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] +
1
2
)
. Since the dominant term experiences
a dip at α = α†, we can use α† as the power-splitting factor
of the SC-FFFD technique.
Since E|hCB |2 [P2] and E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] cannot be de-
rived in closed-form, we cannot analytically evaluate the
point of intersection α† in closed form. To circum-
vent this problem, we compute an approximation on α†
by computing the point of intersection between a lower
bound on P11
(
P3,avg + E|hCB |2 [P2]
)
and a lower bound
P10
(
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] +
1
2
)
. Towards that direction, the following
proposition provides a tight lower bound on E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ].
Proposition 5. The term E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] satisfies the inequality
E|hCB |2 [P
c
2 ] > P
c
2,avg =
4d2N2o
4d2N2o + (No + (1 − α))(1 − α)2
.
(31)
Proof. We apply the lower bound on P c2,avg by using an upper
bound on the Marcum-Q function which results in P c2 ≥ 1−
e
− 12
( √
ξ
σB1
−
|A|
σB1
)2
. Subsequently, we notice that
√
ξ > 3|A|,
and therefore simplify the bound to P c2 ≥ 1 − e−2
( |A|
σB1
)2
Finally, we average this bound over |hCB|2 to obtain (31).
In addition to the bound in (31), we also observe that
E|hCB |2 [P2] > 0 trivially. Using these two lower bounds,
we are interested in computing the range of values of α in
which P11P3,avg dominates the term P10
(
P c2,avg +
1
2
)
. Note
that both these terms are in closed form, and as a result,
the point of intersection between the two can be computed
analytically. To assist computing the dominant term between
the two, we show in Lemma 6 that P3,avg is a decreasing
function of α, and also show in Lemma 7 that
(
P c2,avg +
1
2
)
is an increasing function of α. Furthermore, given that P11 and
P10 are decreasing and increasing functions of α, respectively,
we show that computing the value of α at which P11P3,avg
intersects with P10
(
P c2,avg +
1
2
)
gives the range of values of
α for which P11P3,avg dominates the term P10
(
P c2,avg +
1
2
)
.
Lemma 6. The term P3,avg decreases as α increases in the
interval (0, 1).
Proof. The expression for P3,avg is given by
P3,avg =
2NB1
4NB1 + ℓ2
=
2(No + 1− α)
4(No + 1− α) + 4αsin2
(
pi
M
) .
Differentiating the above w.r.t. α, we get
dP3,avg
dα
=
1
2
[−No−1+α(1−sin2( piM ))]+[(No+1−α)(1−sin
2( piM ))]
[No+1−α(1−sin2( piM ))]
2 . Closely
observing the above equation revels that the denominator is
always a positive quantity, whereas the numerator can be
simplified to obtain −(No + 1)sin2
(
pi
M
)
. Thus,
dP3,avg
dα
is
always negative. Therefore, P3,avg is a decreasing function
w.r.t. α.
Lemma 7. Let ς = cos( pi
M
), where M is the size of the PSK
constellation such that (1− ς2) = µNo, where µ >> 1. When
α ∈ (ς2, 1), P c2,avg is an increasing function of α, and when
α ∈ (0, ς2), we have P c2,avg + 0.5 ≈ 0.5.
Proof. When α ∈ (ς2, 1), it is straightforward to observe that
d2 is an increasing function of α. Also, the term P c2,avg can
be rewritten as
4N2o
4N2o +
(No+(1−α))(1−α)2
d2
.
Since d2 is an increasing function in α ∈ (ς2, 1), and the term
(No+(1−α))(1−α)2 is a decreasing function of α ∈ (0, 1),
the fraction
(No+(1−α))(1−α)
2
d2
is a decreasing function of α in
the range α ∈ (ς2, 1). This completes the proof that P c2,avg is
an increasing function of α when α ∈ (ς2, 1). For the second
part, the term P c2,avg is upper bounded as
4d2N2o
(No + (1− α))(1 − α)2 + 4µN3o
,
by using the lower bound d2 ≥ 1 − ς2 = µNo in the second
term of the denominator. Furthermore, we can upper bound d2
in the numerator by 1− α by using the lower bound ς > √α
in the range α ∈ (0, ς2). Let us also denote (1 − α) = ρNo,
where ρ > 0. With that the upper bound can now be written
as
4ρN3o
N3o (ρ
3 + ρ2) + 4µN3o
=
4ρ
(ρ3 + ρ2 + 4µ)
,
where ρ ≥ µ since α ≤ ς2 and 1 − ς2 = µNo. Finally, since
ρ ≥ µ >> 1, the above term is a negligible number, and
therefore, P c2,avg + 0.5 ≈ 0.5. This completes the proof for
the second part.
From Lemma 1, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7, we deduce
that P11P3,avg decreases with α, whereas P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5)
increases with α. With that the following theorem shows that
P11P3,avg and P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5) intersect only once in the
interval (0, 1)
Theorem 8. When SNR is sufficiently large, the terms
P11P3,avg and P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5) intersect only at one value
of α, say α∗, in the interval (0, 1).
Proof. Let f1(α) = P11P3,avg and P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5). Evalu-
ating the extreme values of f1(α) and f2(α), we get
f1(0) = P11P3,avg|α=0 =
1
2
,
f2(0) = P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5)
∣∣
α=0
<
1
2
,
where the second inequality applies since P10|α=0 << 1 and
P c2,avg + 0.5 ≈ 0.5 for α = 0 (from Lemma 7). Similarly,
f1(1) = P11P3,avg|α=1 = Noe−1,
f2(1) = P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5)
∣∣
α=1
≈ 3
2
(1− e−1).
Finally, we define f(α) , f1(α)−f2(α). Since f1(0) > f2(0)
and f1(1) < f2(1), we have f(0) > 0 and f(1) < 0. In
addition, since f(α) is a decreasing function of α, it implies
that f(α) has a unique root. Therefore, f(α∗) = 0 for some
α∗ ∈ (0, 1). This completes the proof.
With α∗ being the point of intersection between P11P3,avg
and P10(P
c
2,avg+0.5), we propose to use the value of α
∗ as the
power-splitting factor between Alice and Charlie to implement
the SC-FFFD relaying scheme. In practice, we can use the well
known Newton-Raphson algorithm (NR) [13] to compute the
root of f(α) = P11P3,avg − P10(P c2,avg + 0.5) as a function
of the M -PSK constellation, noise variance No, and σ
2
AC .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to showcase
the effectiveness of the proposed SC-FFFD technique to
mitigate the jamming attack by a FD adversary. Through-
out this section, we use the system model in Section II
wherein the channels are distributed as hAB ∼ CN (0, 1),
hCB ∼ CN (0, 1), and hAC ∼ CN (0, 4). We specifically
choose σ2AC = 4 to showcase the benefits of the SC-FFFD
technique when the channel between Alice and Charlie is more
reliable than that between Alice (or Charlie) and Bob. We also
use SNR = 1
No
throughout this section. First, to present the
variation of the error performance of the SC-FFFD technique
with the power-splitting factor α ∈ (0, 1), we plot the average
probability of error of various joint decoders in Fig. 3 as
a function α at SNR = 35 dB, and with 4-, and 8-PSK at
Charlie. We use Monte-Carlo simulations to plot the average
probability of error of the decoding metrics in (4) (the joint
MAP decoder), (5) (the joint MAX decoder), and (8) (the
joint dominant decoder). However, to plot the union bound
in (24), we have used a combination of analytical expressions
and numerical integration techniques. The plots in Fig. 3 show
that the curves decrease as a function of α upto a certain point,
and then shoots up as α approaches 1. This behavior of the
curves is very intuitive as α = 0 signifies that Charlie is not
sending any message. Therefore, since Bob jointly decodes
the information symbols of Alice and Charlie, he would have
to guess Charlie’s symbol, thereby resulting in degraded error
performance. Similarly, when α = 1, Bob would have to guess
Alice’s symbol, and that explains the steep rise in the error.
Between these extreme values, as α increases, the performance
gradually improves because Charlie injects more power for its
symbols. We also plot the union bound in (24) to compare it
with the average probability of error of the joint decoders. It
can be observed that the dip in α for all the three decoders
are very close to each other.
As one of the main contributions of this work, we provide
an analytical approach to compute the value of α at which
the average probability of error of the joint dominant decoder
experiences a dip over α ∈ (0, 1). As explained in Section IV,
we propose to solve the intersection point between P11P3,avg
and P10(P
c
2,avg + 0.5), denoted by α
∗, using the well-known
Newton-Raphson (NR) algorithm. To depict the closeness
between this intersection point and the minima of the union
bound, we plot both of them in Fig. 4 as a function of α at
SNR = 35 dB, and with 4-PSK at Charlie.
When using α∗ as the power-splitting factor between Alice
and Charlie, in Fig. 5, we plot the error performance of FFFD
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Fig. 3. Average probability of error of various joint decoders of the SC-FFFD
technique as a function of α ∈ (0, 1) at SNR = 35 dB. The plots show that
the minimum probability of error is achieved at a value of α close to α = 1.
Similar behavior is also observed with the bound in (24).
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Fig. 4. Depiction of the intersection point between P11P3,avg and
P10(P c2,avg + 0.5) as a function of α ∈ (0, 1) at SNR = 35 dB and 4-PSK
at Charlie. The point of intersection is approximately close to the minima of
the bound in (24).
α∗-JMAP decoder, FFFD α∗-JMAX decoder, and FFFD α∗-
JD decoder as a function of SNR. In this context, we have
prefixed α∗ with JMAP and JMAX variants of the decoder
to highlight that for each SNR value, the corresponding value
of α∗ is obtained from the NR algorithm. The plots show
that using FFFD α∗-JMAP decoder provides the best error
performance among the three decoders. Furthermore, we also
present the error performance of the FFFD αE -JMAP decoder,
wherein the value of αE ∈ (0, 1) minimizes the average prob-
ability of error of the JMAP decoder. We have computed αE
through exhaustive search over the interval (0, 1) in steps of
0.001. The plots also show that the FFFD αE-JMAP decoder
provides error performance very close to that of the α∗-JMAP
decoder. However, unlike the FFFD α∗-JMAP decoder, the
best value of αE can only be computed using exhaustive
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Fig. 5. Average probability of error of several joint decoders against various
SNR values. The proposed FFFD joint dominant decoder is able to drive down
the probability of error with increasing SNR while providing low-complexity
analytical solutions to derive the power-splitting ratio.
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Fig. 6. Symbol-error-probability of information symbols of Alice and Charlie
with and without using the SC-FFFD technique against different SNR values.
It is clear from the plots that Charlie bails out Alice from the jamming attack
at the cost of degradation in its error performance.
search through simulations. As a result, applying the FFFD
αE-JMAP decoder in practice is prohibitively complex. As
a competitive baseline for the SC-FFFD technique, we have
also considered an alternate cooperative relaying technique,
wherein Alice continues to transmit her OOK symbols on
the frequency band fAB. Meanwhile, Charlie, which works in
the half-duplex mode, listens to Alice’s symbol by tuning to
the frequency band fAB , decodes it, and then instantaneously
rotates its chosen PSK symbol by either pi
N
or 0 radians,
depending on whether the decoded bit is 1 or 0, respectively.
Finally, the modified PSK symbol is transmitted to Bob on
the frequency band fCB. Note that this scheme does not
involve any power-splitting factor since Alice continues to
communicate on the frequency band fAB . Referring to this
scheme as the Fast-Forward Half-Duplex (FFHD) technique,
we also plot the average probability of error of the joint MAP
decoder (denoted by FFHD JMAP decoder) in Fig. 5 under
two scenarios: (i) when the location of Dave is such that the
jamming energy on the frequency band fAB does not reach
Charlie’s receiver, and (ii) when the location of Dave is such
that the jamming energy on the frequency band fAB reaches
Charlie’s receiver as significant interference (denoted by I).
The plots show that the FFHD scheme in the former scenario
outperforms the proposed SC-FFFD relaying scheme, whereas
the FFHD scheme in the latter scenario is not a favorable
choice.
Finally, we discuss the trade-off offered by the SC-FFFD
scheme in improving the error performance of Alice’s com-
munication at the cost of degrading the error performance
of Charlie’s communication. In Fig. 6, we plot the average
symbol error probability in decoding Alice’s and Charlie’s
information symbols before and after executing the SC-FFFD
technique. To generate these plots, we use 4-PSK at Charlie
and OOK at Alice both before and after the SC-FFFD tech-
nique. Based on the plots in Fig. 6, it is intuitive that after
using α∗ as the power-splitting factor of the SC-FFFD scheme,
Alice’s performance improves drastically as its information
symbols are encoded in the form of rotation of PSK con-
stellation, as well as the noise variance of the effective noise.
However, it is observed that Charlie’s performance deteriorates
because Bob has to now make a decision between 8 PSK
symbols to decode Charlie’s information symbols. Overall, we
highlight that the proposed cooperative relaying strategy serves
the purpose of forcing the attacker to continue executing the
DOS attack on fAB , while making sure that none of the other
nodes in the network experience DOS attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel cooperative mitiga-
tion strategy, referred to as the SC-FFFD scheme to facilitate
communication of low-latency packets in the presence of a
full-duplex adversary. We have observed that although the
helper node takes a hit in its error performance, the victim
node can reliably communicate its packets to the destination.
Moreover, the two nodes cooperatively inject power on the
jammed frequency so as to keep the adversary engaged on the
jammed frequency band. As one of the main contributions
of this work, we have analyzed the error performance of
jointly decoding the information symbols of the victim and the
helper node when they employ the OOK and PSK modulation,
respectively. Our analysis has shown that an appropriate value
of the power-splitting factor can be analytically computed by
observing the dominant error events of the average probability
of error of the joint decoder. We strongly believe that the
proposed solutions are effective in scenarios wherein (i) the
number of frequency bands to hop is limited compared to the
number of users in the network, and (ii) there exists users
equipped with full-duplex radios to assist the victim node.
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